Exploring Imperial Nostalgia: Lessons from the Soviet Collapse

Romanticism as a Political Hazard: The Link to Alienation

Romanticism is an ideology that can be dangerous because it often arises from a state of political alienation. In my view, this difficult situation can be overcome constructively by changing the material conditions that cause alienation. Otherwise, there is a risk that this kind of romanticism will be interpreted by those in power as cynicism. The theories of thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger might be seen as the result of such a reactionary approach. I will not discuss the close connection of such ideas with German fascism, as that is beyond the scope of this brief note, which is intended merely to make a point for the historical record.

The Shock Doctrine and the Phantom Limb: Gaydar’s Metaphor

I must admit that I am in a difficult position, as I need to use an effective metaphor from a source whose work I do not particularly admire: Yegor Gaydar. As an active figure in Boris Yeltsin’s government during Russia’s neoliberal transition, Gaydar implemented a liquidation program, often called the “shock doctrine,” that was arguably misguided in hindsight. His actions led to a rapid decline in the economic and social gains the country had accumulated over the years. In this regard, he was arguably as “successful” as his bosses, Yeltsin and Gorbachev. The policies of plunder and looting led to the death of thousands from hunger and homelessness in a country that had long enjoyed full employment. Millions more became unemployed.

To explain this using Gaydar’s metaphor: when a political order dominated by a long-standing, quasi-imperial ideology collapses, it can be extremely difficult for people to accept the collapse, especially if that order presented itself as eternal. The situation is like that of a person whose leg has been amputated but who still feels discomfort where the limb used to be. The leg is gone, but the sensation persists. (Gaydar, 2022: 23)

Unfortunately, the situation of many Russians today is similar to this. The Soviet Union is gone, but its legacy continues to be felt by its people.

The Unacknowledged Truths: Soviet Disintegration

The Soviet Union’s dissolution, from its center to its periphery, was a conscious, voluntary process driven by mass mobilization, sometimes even encouraged by the ruling Communist Party leadership. In the author’s opinion, today’s Russian elites have yet to accept or come to terms with this simple and unvarnished truth.

It is also important to note that the Soviet Union was not an empire or a geopolitical necessity but a unique form of unified, federated states based on ideological and economic unity rather than religion or nationalism. This is the second simple truth they struggle to accept.

Imperial Nostalgia vs. Class Struggle: Russia’s Current Path

I am not sure if the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the most ideal outcome, especially given the unfortunate developments we have seen since. Nevertheless, it disintegrated, and it did so with the active support of the most politically engaged segments of the Russian people, who were mobilized by the capitalist appropriators at the forefront. It is essential that all parties come to terms with this difficult reality and return to the real world as soon as possible to address this social trauma and prevent more destructive consequences.

Political leaders may be using this trauma to mobilize the masses. Interestingly, Russians do not seem to be considering overcoming this social trauma through a class struggle, which would be a constructive step forward. It would be a positive move to hold their own oligarchs and renegades accountable. Instead, they seem to be emulating a purely imperial discourse. They are drawing on a “Stalin-era aesthetic” to align with the current interests of the Russian bourgeoisie, while also expressing a form of “Great Russian nationalism”—a concept also found in Soviet ideology. If Stalin were still alive, I believe he would have strong words for so-called leftists who lose sight of the crucial issue of nationalities. I doubt he would have viewed the nationalities question in the same way as today’s admirers of fascism.

Lenin’s Warning: Imperialism and National Oppression

As is widely understood among those with a basic understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory, annexation is considered by many to be the most fundamental form of national oppression. Furthermore, when this annexation is carried out with the aim of protecting the global interests of the powers that carry it out, more precisely, to protect the coastal regions (Rimland) in the geo-strategic plan, its imperialist character becomes completely transparent. For those who like the word “Soviet”, Lenin’s Imperialism: ‘The Highest Stage of Capitalism’ (1917 Russian edition) can be an important source. At one point in his preface to this work Lenin states (1978: 8),

It is painful, in these days of liberty, to re-read the passages of the pamphlet which have been distorted, cramped, compressed in an iron vice on account of the censor. That the period of imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution; that social-chauvinism (socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is the utter betrayal of socialism, complete desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie; that this split in the working-class movement is bound up with the objective conditions of imperialism, etc.—on these matters I had to speak in a “slavish” tongue, and I must refer the reader who is interested in the subject to the articles I wrote abroad in 1914-17, a new edition of which is soon to appear. In order to show the reader, in a guise acceptable to the censors, how shamelessly untruthful the capitalists and the social-chauvinists who have deserted to their side (and whom Kautsky opposes so inconsistently) are on the question of annexations; in order to show how shamelessly they screen the annexations of their capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example—Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan, and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians, for Korea.

I believe that this provides a sufficient foundation for further discussion.

Post-Soviet Evolution: From Chaos to Constructed Ideologies

Since the late 1980s, Russia has seen a notable presence of an eclectic, abstract, and agitational discourse of “democracy.” After the Great Disintegration, there was a political will to force an abrupt transition to neoliberalism. In an effort to achieve a smooth transition, various hybrid models of governance were considered. The result was a “constitutional crisis,” as would be expected from a political science perspective. It soon became clear that this “choice,” whether made or imposed, might not fully align with Russia’s unique structural characteristics.

In Western Europe, capitalism followed its classical path. In other countries, however, different and unique paths have been taken, with conflicting forms and characters. In established multinational empires like Russia and Turkey, hybrid forms appear to be prevalent. After nearly a decade of crisis, the country has achieved some political stability, and there has been an attempt to address the identity crisis by developing constructed ideologies. The most prominent of these is Russian Eurasianism.

The Unanswered Questions of Soviet Collapse: Cadre and Bureaucracy

Those who are stuck in Soviet romanticism should ask themselves some questions: Why did the Soviet Union fail to train top political cadres? Why did the entire system fall apart when just four people at the top died? Did other cadres not rise as they should have, and if so, why couldn’t they? Was there a lack of ideological struggle over the problem of the relationship between man and power? Could this problem still exist today? These are simple questions, and answering them will lead to many insights.

Nostalgia’s Paradox: Imperial Fantasies vs. Progressive Action

The Russian elites are currently engaged in a variety of risky political and military ventures, seemingly to accumulate capital and maintain national cohesion. These “methods” include reviving imperial fantasies, using various religious interpretations for political purposes, and exporting all kinds of reaction to neighboring countries.

However, if these people truly had such a strong affection for the Soviet Union that they felt nostalgic about it, they should have done two simple things. First, they should have engaged in a class struggle with their own oligarchs, opposing all imperial missions and ambitions. They should have launched a broad political campaign to examine the dynamics that led to their internal disintegration and held the circles behind it accountable. In this context, they would have examined the problem of cadre training caused by the bureaucracy organizing itself on a class level. I am convinced that nationalism is the primary factor here. It is clear that the Soviets condemned bourgeois nationalism, but their actions were aimed at supporting the Russian bourgeoisie.

Second, they should have opposed the politicization of religion. They still need a decisive, long-term stance on this issue. They should condemn governments that use religion for political gain, not support them. Only in this way could they be the guardians of what the world truly lacks today: progressivism. But they have never done so. The steps they have taken are barely compatible with the nostalgic themes they use. Russia’s role in supporting national oppression, imperialist domination, and various religious forms of reaction has been undeniable for some time. We must all do our utmost to oppose these tendencies. We must consider the impact of all imperial projects without being selective. There is no other way.

The Legacy of Loyalty: Suslov and the System’s Decay

What did Leonid Brezhnev say to Heydar Aliyev when he was talking about Mikhail Gorbachev, the general secretary who would rise two positions after him? He said he was the king of sheep! Brezhnev said this during a visit to Aliyev, an important party official who later rose to the Politburo, at a May Day demonstration in Azerbaijan. From Yegor Ligachev’s book, you can learn how Gorbachev demonstrated his “expertise” by letting the 1990 harvest rot in the fields (and by being interested in everything except agricultural problems (Ligachev, 1995: 62)). In fact, it seems Brezhnev was mocking this caricature of a party man while signaling that he was going to promote him.

At this point, it is interesting to note the similarities with the historical account of political corruption in ancient Rome, as recorded by the philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s perspective shows that a corrupt political system survives by elevating individuals who are unqualified but blindly loyal to their superiors. Mikhail Suslov was undoubtedly the key figure in managing the system for a significant period—approximately 40 years. In fact, he was the person primarily responsible for its operation.

The Unsettling Question: The Persistence of Nostalgia

It is ironic that this individual, in a society that values leisure time, died from exhaustion. Despite all this, I cannot help but ask what these people are still nostalgic about?

Perhaps they are finding comfort in nostalgia and cynicism—who knows?